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Abstract
Ad exchanges are an emerging platform for trading advertisement slots on the web
with billions of dollars revenue per year. Every time a user visits a web page, the
publisher of that web page can ask an ad exchange to auction off the ad slots on this
page to determine which advertisements are shown at which price. Due to the high
volume of traffic, ad networks typically act as mediators for individual advertisers at ad
exchanges. If multiple advertisers in an ad network are interested in the ad slots of the
same auction, the ad network might use a “local” auction to resell the obtained ad slots
among its advertisers.
In this work we want to deepen the theoretical understanding of these new markets by
analyzing them from the viewpoint of combinatorial auctions. Prior work studied mostly
single-item auctions, while we allow the advertisers to express richer preferences over
multiple items. We develop a game-theoretic model for the entanglement of the central
auction at the ad exchange with the local auctions at the ad networks. We consider the
incentives of all three involved parties and suggest a three-party competitive equilibrium,
an extension of the Walrasian equilibrium that ensures envy-freeness for all participants.
We show the existence of a three-party competitive equilibrium and a polynomial-time
algorithm to find one for gross-substitute bidder valuations.
1 Introduction
As advertising on the web becomes more mature, ad exchanges (AdX) play a growing role as
a platform for selling advertisement slots from publishers to advertisers [KMN15]. Following
the Yahoo! acquisition of Right Media in 2007, all major web companies, such as Google,
Facebook, and Amazon, have created or acquired their own ad exchanges. Other major ad
exchanges are provided by the Rubicon Project, OpenX, and AppNexus. Every time a user
visits a web page, the publisher of that web page can ask an ad exchange to auction off the ad
slots on this page. Thus, the goods traded at an ad exchange are ad impressions. This process
is also known as real-time bidding (RTB). A web page might contain multiple ad slots, which
are currently modeled to be sold separately in individual auctions. Individual advertisers
typically do not directly participate in these auctions but entrust some ad network to bid
on their behalf. When a publisher sends an ad impression to an exchange, the exchange
∗A short version of this paper appeared in [BZHL15].
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usually contacts several ad networks and runs a (variant of a) second-price auction [MMN12]
between them, potentially with a reserve price under which the impression is not sold. An
ad network (e.g. Google’s Display Network [GDN]) might then run a second, “local” auction
to determine the allocation of the ad slot among its advertisers. We study this interaction of
a central auction at the exchange and local auctions at the ad networks.1
We develop a game-theoretic model that considers the incentives of the following three
parties: (1) the ad exchange, (2) the ad networks, and (3) the advertisers. As the ad exchange
usually charges a fixed percentage of the revenue and hands the rest to the publishers, the
ad exchange and the publishers have the same objective and can be modeled as one entity.
We then study equilibrium concepts of this new model of a three-party exchange. Our model
is described as an ad exchange, but it may also model other scenarios with mediators that
act between bidders and sellers, as noted already by Feldman et al. [FMM+10]. The main
differences between our model and earlier models (discussed in detail at the end of this
section) are the following: (a) We consider the incentives of all three parties simultaneously.
(b) While most approaches in prior work use Bayesian assumptions, we apply worst-case
analysis. (c) We allow auctions with multiple heterogeneous items, namely combinatorial
auctions, in contrast to the single-item auctions studied so far. Multiple items arise naturally
when selling ad slots on a per-impression basis, since there are usually multiple advertisement
slots on a web page.
To motivate the incentives of ad networks and exchanges, we compare next their short
and long-term revenue considerations, following Mansour et al. [MMN12] and Muthukrish-
nan [Mut09]. Ad exchanges and ad networks generate revenue as follows: (1) An ad exchange
usually receives some percentage of the price paid by the winner(s) of the central auction.
(2) An ad network can charge a higher price to its advertisers than it paid to the exchange
or it can be paid via direct contracts with its advertisers. Thus both the ad exchange and
the ad networks (might) profit from higher prices in their auctions. However, they also have
a motivation not to charge too high prices as (a) the advertisers could stick to alternative
advertising channels such as long-term contracts with publishers, and (b) there is a significant
competition between the various ad exchanges and ad networks, as advertisers can easily
switch to a competitor. Thus, lower prices (might) increase advertiser participation and,
hence, the long-term revenue of ad exchanges and ad networks. We only consider a single
auction (of multiple items) and leave it as an open question to study changes over time. We
still take the long-term considerations outlined above into account by assuming that the ad
exchange aligns its strategic behavior with its long-term revenue considerations and only
desires for each central auction to sell all items.2 In our model the incentive of an ad network
to participate in the exchange comes from the opportunity to purchase some items at a
low price and then resell them at a higher price. However, due to long-term considerations,
our model additionally requires the ad networks to “satisfy their advertisers” by faithfully
representing the advertisers’ preferences towards the exchange, while still allowing the ad
networks to extract revenue from the competition between the advertisers in their network.3
1In this work an auction is an algorithm to determine prices of items and their allocation to bidders.
2Our model and results can be adapted to include reserve prices under which the ad exchange is not
willing to sell an item.
3We implicitly assume that the central auction prices are accessible to the advertisers such that they can
verify whether an ad network represented their preferences correctly. Informally, we suggest that if one ad
network “satisfies its advertisers” then, over time, all ad networks have to follow this behavior to keep their
2
An example for this kind of restriction for an ad network is Google’s Display Network [GDN]
that guarantees its advertisers that each ad impression is sold via a second-price auction,
independent of whether an ad exchange is involved in the transaction or not [MMN12].
To model a stable outcome in a three-party exchange, we use the equilibrium concept of
envy-freeness for all three types of participants. A participant is envy-free if he receives his
most preferred set of items under the current prices. Envy-freeness for all participants is a
natural notion to express stability in a market, as it implies that no coalition of participants
would strictly profit from deviating from the current allocation and prices (assuming truthfully
reported preferences). Thus an envy-free equilibrium supports stability in the market prices,
which in turn facilitates, for example, revenue prediction for prospective participants and
hence might increase participation and long-term revenue. For only two parties, i.e., sellers
and buyers, where the sellers have no intrinsic value for the items they sell, envy-freeness for
all participants is equal to a competitive or Walrasian equilibrium [Wal74], a well established
notion in economics to characterize an equilibrium in a market where demand equals supply.
We provide a generalization of this equilibrium concept to three parties.
Our Contribution We introduce the following model for ad exchanges. A central seller
wants to sell k items. There are m mediatorsMi, each with her own ni bidders. Each bidder
has a valuation function over all subsets of the items. In the ad exchange setting, the central
seller is the ad exchange, the items are the ad slots shown to a visitor of a web page, the
mediators are the ad networks, and the bidders are the advertisers. A bidder does not have
any direct “connection” to the central seller. Instead, all communication is done through the
mediators. A mechanism for allocating the items to the bidders is composed of a central
auction with mediators acting as bidders, and then local auctions, one per mediator, in
which every mediator allocates the set of items she bought in the central auction; that is, an
auction where the bidders of that mediator are the only participating bidders and the items
that the mediator received in the central auction are the sole items. The prices of the items
obtained in the central auction provide a lower bound for the prices in the local auctions,
i.e., they act as reserve prices in the local auctions. We assume that the central seller and
the bidders have quasi-linear utilities, i.e., utility functions that are linear in the price, and
that their incentive is to maximize their utility. For the central seller this means that his
utility from selling a set of slots is just the sum of prices of the items in the set. The utility
of a bidder on receiving a set of items S is his value for S minus the sum of the prices of the
items in S.
The incentive of a mediator, however, is not so straightforward and needs to be defined
carefully. In our model, to “satisfy” her bidders, each mediator guarantees her bidders that
the outcome of the local auction will be minimal envy free, that is, for the final local price
vector, the item set that is allocated to any bidder is one of his most desirable sets over all
possible item sets (even sets that contain items that were not allocated to his mediator, i.e.,
each bidder is not only locally, but globally envy-free) and there is no (item-wise) smaller
price vector that fulfills this requirement. We assume that each mediator wants to maximize
her revenue4 and define the revenue of a mediator for a set of items S as the difference
between her earnings when selling S with this restriction and the price she has to pay for S
advertisers.
4For the purpose of this paper, the terms revenue and utility are interchangeable.
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at the central auction.
For this model we define a new equilibrium concept, namely the three-party competitive
equilibrium. At this equilibrium all three types of participants are envy-free. Envy-free
solutions for the bidders always exist, as one can set the prices of all items high enough so
that no bidder will demand any item. Additionally, we require that there is no envy for the
central seller, meaning that all items are sold. If there were no mediators, then a two-party
envy-free solution would be exactly a Walrasian equilibrium, which for certain scenarios can
be guaranteed [KC82]. However, with mediators it is not a-priori clear that a three-party
competitive equilibrium exists as, additionally, the mediators have to be envy-free. We show
that for our definition of a mediator’s revenue (a) the above requirements are fulfilled and
(b) a three-party competitive equilibrium exists whenever a Walrasian equilibrium for the
central auction exists or whenever a two-party equilibrium exists for the bidders and the
central seller without mediators. Interestingly, we show that for gross-substitute bidder
valuations the incentives of this kind of mediator can be represented with an or-valuation
over the valuations of her bidders. This then leads to the following result: For gross-substitute
bidder valuations a three-party competitive equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time.
In particular, we will show how to compute the three-party competitive equilibrium with
minimum prices.
Related Work The theoretical research on ad exchanges was initialized by a survey of
Muthukrishnan [Mut09] that lists several interesting research directions. Our approach
specifically addresses his 9th problem, namely to enable the advertisers to express more
complex preferences that arise when multiple advertisement slots are auctioned off at once
as well as to design suitable auctions for the exchange and the ad networks to determine
allocation and prices given these preferences.
The most closely related work with respect to the model of the ad exchange is Feld-
man et al. [FMM+10]. It is similar to our work in two aspects: (1) The mediator bids on
behalf of her bidders in a central auction and the demand of the mediator as well as the
tentative allocation and prices for reselling to her bidders are determined via a local auction.
(2) The revenue of the mediator is the price she can obtain from reselling minus the price
she paid in the central auction. The main differences are: (a) Only one item is auctioned at
a time and thus the mediator can determine her valuation with a single local auction. (b)
Their work does not consider the incentives of the bidders, only of the mediators and the
central seller. (c) A Bayesian setting is used where the mediators and the exchange know the
probability distributions of the bidders’ valuations. Based on this information, the mediators
and the exchange choose reserve prices for their second-price auctions to maximize their
revenue. The work characterizes the equilibrium strategies for the selection of the reserve
prices.
Mansour et al. [MMN12] (mainly) describe the auction at the DoubleClick exchange.
Similar to our work, advertisers use ad networks as mediators for the central auction. They
observe that if mediators that participate in a single-item, second-price central auction are
only allowed to submit a single bid, then it is not possible for the central auction to correctly
implement a second-price auction over all bidders as the bidders with the highest and the
second highest value might use the same mediator. Thus they introduce the Optional Second
Price auction, where every mediator is allowed to optionally submit the second highest bid
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with the highest bid. In such an auction each mediator can guarantee to her bidders that
if one of them is allocated the item, then he pays the (global) second-price for it. For the
single-item setting, the bidders in their auction and in our auction pay the same price. If the
mediator of the winning bidder did not specify an optional second price, then her revenue
will equal the revenue of our mediator. If she did, her revenue will be zero and the central
seller will receive the gain between the prices in the local and the central auction.
Stavrogiannis et al. [SGP13] consider a game between bidders and mediators, where the
bidders can select mediators (based on Bayesian assumptions of each other’s valuations) and
the mediators can set the reserve prices in the second-price local auction. The work presents
mixed Nash equilibrium strategies for the bidders to select their mediator. In [SGP14] the
same authors compare different single-item local auctions with respect to the achieved social
welfare and the revenue of the mediators and the exchange.
Balseiro et al. (2015) introduced a setting that does not include mediators [BBW15].
Instead, they see the ad exchange as a game between publishers, who select parameters
such as reserve prices for second-price auctions, and advertisers, whose budget constraints
link different auctions over time. They introduced a new equilibrium concept for this game
and used this to analyze the impact of auction design questions such as the selection of a
reserve price. Balseiro et al. (2014) [BFM+14] and Dvořák and Henzinger [DH14] studied a
publisher’s trade-off between using an ad exchange versus fulfilling long-term contracts with
advertisers.
Equilibria in trading networks (such as ad exchanges) are also addressed in the “matching
with contracts” literature. Hatfield and Milgrom [HM05] presented a new model where
instead of bidders and items there are agents and trades between pairs of agents. The
potential trades are modeled as edges in a graph where the agents are represented by
the nodes. Agent valuations are then defined over the potential trades and assumed to
be monotone substitute. They proved the existence of an (envy-free) equilibrium when
the agent-trades graph is bipartite. Later this was improved to directed acyclic graphs
by Ostrovsky [Ost08] and to arbitrary graphs by Hatfield et al. [HKN+13]. They did not
show (polynomial-time) algorithms to reach equilibria. Our model can be reduced to this
model, hence a three-party equilibrium exists when all bidders are monotone gross substitute.
However, we are not aware of a reduction that is polynomial in the number of bidders and
items.
Outline We formally define our model for ad exchanges in Section 3. In Section 4 we
present our main results for gross-substitute bidders, including a polynomial-time algorithm
to compute a three-party competitive equilibrium. Finally we conclude and suggest future
directions in Section 5.
2 Preliminaries
Let Ω denote a set of k items. A price vector is an assignment of a non-negative price to
every element of Ω. For a price vector p = (p1, ..., pk) and a set S ⊆ Ω we use p(S) =
∑
j∈S pj .
For any two price vectors p, r an inequality such as p ≥ r as well as the operations min(p, r)
and max(p, r) are meant item-wise.
We denote with 〈Ωb〉 = 〈Ωb〉b∈B an allocation of the items in Ω such that for all bidders
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b ∈ B the set of items allocated to b is given by Ωb and we have Ωb ⊆ Ω and Ωb ∩Ωb′ = ∅ for
b′ 6= b, b′ ∈ B. Note that some items might not be allocated to any bidder.
A valuation function vb of a bidder b is a function from 2Ω to R, where 2Ω denotes the set
of all subsets of Ω. We assume throughout the paper vb(∅) = 0. Unless specified otherwise,
for this work we assume monotone valuations, that is, for S ⊆ T we have vb(S) ≤ vb(T ).
This assumption is made for ease of presentation. We use {vb} to denote a collection of
valuation functions. The utility of a bidder b from a set S ⊆ Ω at prices p ≥ 0 is defined
as ub,p(S) = vb(S)− p(S). Such utility functions are often called quasi-linear, i.e., linear in
the price. The demand Db(p) of a bidder b for prices p ≥ 0 is the set of subsets of items
S ⊆ Ω that maximize the bidder’s utility at prices p. We call a set in the demand a demand
representative. Throughout the paper we omit subscripts if they are clear from the context.
Definition 2.1 (Envy free). An allocation 〈Ωb〉 of items Ω to bidders B is envy free (on Ω)
for some prices p if for all bidders b ∈ B, Ωb ∈ Db(p). We say that prices p are envy free
(on Ω) if there exists an envy-free allocation (on Ω) for these prices.
There exist envy-free prices for any valuation functions of the bidders, e.g., set all prices
to maxb,S vb(S). For these prices the allocation which does not allocate any item is envy
free. Thus also minimal envy-free prices always exist, but are in general not unique.
Definition 2.2 (Walrasian equilibrium (we)). A Walrasian equilibrium (on Ω) is an envy-
free allocation 〈Ωb〉 (on Ω) with prices p such that all prices are non-negative and the price
of unallocated items is zero. We call the allocation 〈Ωb〉 a Walrasian allocation (on Ω) and
the prices p Walrasian prices (on Ω).
We assume that the central seller has a value of zero for every subset of the items; thus
(with quasi-linear utility functions) selling all items makes the seller envy free. In this case a
Walrasian equilibrium can be seen as an envy-free two-party equilibrium, i.e., envy free for
the buyers and the seller. Note that for a Walrasian price vector there might exist multiple
envy-free allocations.
2.1 Valuation Classes
A unit demand valuation assigns a value to every item and defines the value of a set as the
maximum value of an item in it. An additive valuation also assigns a value to every item
but defines the value of a set as the sum of the values of the items in the set. Non-negative
unit demand and non-negative additive valuations both have the gross-substitute property
(defined below) and are by definition monotone.
Definition 2.3 (Gross substitute (gs)). A valuation function is gross substitute if for
every two price vectors p(2) ≥ p(1) ≥ 0 and every set D(1) ∈ D(p(1)), there exists a set
D(2) ∈ D(p(2)) with j ∈ D(2) for every j ∈ D(1) with p(1)j = p(2)j .
For gross-substitute valuations of the bidders a Walrasian equilibrium is guaranteed to
exist in a two-sided market [KC82] and can be computed in polynomial time [NS06, PL14].
Further, gross substitute is the maximal valuation class containing the unit demand class for
which the former holds [GS99]. Several equivalent definitions are known for this class [GS99,
PL14]. We will further use that for gross-substitute valuations the Walrasian prices form a
complete lattice [GS99].
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We define next an or-valuation. Lehmann et al. [LLN06] showed that the or of gross-
substitute valuations is gross substitute.
Definition 2.4 (or-player). The or of two valuations v and w is defined as (v or w)(S) =
maxR,T⊆S,R∩T=∅(v(R) + w(T )). Given a set of valuations {vb} for bidders b ∈ B, we say
that the or-player is a player with valuation vor(S) = max〈Sb〉
∑
b∈B vb(Sb) .
3 Model and Equilibrium
There are k items to be allocated to m mediators. Each mediatorMi represents a set Bi of
bidders, where |Bi| = ni. Each bidder is connected to a unique mediator. Each bidder has a
valuation function over all subsets of the items and a quasi-linear utility function. A central
auction is an auction run on all items with mediators as bidders. After an allocation 〈Ωi〉
and prices r at the central auction are set, another m local auctions are conducted, one by
each mediator. In the local auction for mediatorMi the items Ωi that were allocated to her
in the central auction are the sole items and the bidders Bi are the sole bidders. A solution
is an assignment of central-auction and local-auction prices to items and an allocation of
items to bidders and hence, by uniqueness, also to mediators. We define next a three-party
equilibrium based on envy-freeness.
Definition 3.1 (Equilibrium). A three-party competitive equilibrium is an allocation of
items to bidders and a set of m + 1 price vectors r, p1, p2, . . . , pm such that the following
requirements hold. For 1 ≤ i ≤ m
1. every mediator5 Mi is allocated a set Ωi in her demand at price r,
2. every item j with non-zero price r is allocated to a mediator,
3. the price pi coincides with r for all items not in Ωi,
4. and every bidder b ∈ Bi is allocated a subset of Ωi that is in his demand at price pi.
In other words, the allocation to the bidders in Bi with prices pi must be envy-free for
the bidders, the allocation to the mediators with prices r must be envy free for the mediators
and for the central seller, i.e., must be a Walrasian equilibrium; and the prices pi must be
equal to the prices r for all items not assigned to mediatorMi.
Note that the allocation of the items to the mediators and prices r are the outcome of
a central auction run by the central seller, while the allocation to the bidders in Bi and
prices pi correspond to the outcome of a local auction run by mediatorMi. These auctions
are connected by the demands of the mediators and Requirement 3.
We next present our mediator model. The definition of an Envy-Free Mediator, or
ef-mediator for short, reflects the following idea: To determine her revenue for a set of items
S at central auction prices r, the mediator simulates the local auction she would run if she
would obtain the set S at prices r. Given the outcome of this “virtual auction”, she can
compute her potential revenue for S and r as the difference between the virtual auction
prices of the items sold in the virtual auction and the central auction prices for the items
5Independent of how the demand of a mediator is defined.
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in S. However, as motivated in the introduction, the mediator is required to represent the
preferences of her bidders and therefore not every set S is “allowed” for the mediator, that is,
for some sets the revenue of the mediator is set to −1. The sets that maximize the revenue
are then in the demand of the mediator at central auction prices r. To make the revenue
of a mediator well-defined and to follow our motivation that a mediator should satisfy her
bidders, the virtual auctions specifically compute minimal envy-free price vectors.
Definition 3.2 (Envy-Free Mediator). An ef-mediatorMi determines her demand for a
price vector r ≥ 0 as follows. For each subset of items S ⊆ Ω she runs a virtual auction with
items S, her bidders Bi, and reserve prices r. We assume that the virtual auction computes
minimal envy-free prices pS ≥ r and a corresponding envy-free allocation 〈Sb〉. We extend
the prices pS to all items in Ω by setting pSj = rj for j ∈ Ω\S, and define the revenue Ri,r(S)
of the mediator for a set S as follows. If the allocation 〈Sb〉 is envy free for the bidders Bi
and prices pS on Ω, then Ri,r(S) =
∑
b∈Bi p
S(Sb)− r(S); otherwise, we set Ri,r(S) = −1.6
The demand Di(r) ofMi is the set of all sets S that maximize the revenue of the mediator
for the reserve prices r. The local auction ofMi for a set Ωi allocated to her in the central
auction at prices r is equal to her virtual auction for Ωi and r.
Note that for a set S with Ri,r(S) =
∑
b∈Bi p
S(Sb)− r(S) the revenue of an ef-mediator
Mi is maximal if the envy-free allocation on S is such that ∑b∈Bi pS(Sb) is as high as
possible. Thus if there are multiple envy-free allocations on S for the prices pS , the mediator
chooses one that maximizes ∑b∈Bi pS(Sb).
Following the above definition, we say that a price vector is locally envy free if it is envy
free for the bidders Bi on the subset Ωi ⊆ Ω assigned to mediatorMi and globally envy free
if it is envy free for the bidders Bi on Ω. Note that if pS is envy free on Ω, then it is minimal
envy free ≥ r on Ω for the bidders Bi.
An interesting property of ef-mediators is that every Walrasian equilibrium in the central
auction can be combined with the outcome of the local auctions of ef-mediators to form a
three-party competitive equilibrium.
Theorem 3.3. Assume all mediators are ef-mediators. Then a Walrasian equilibrium in
the central auction with allocation 〈Ωi〉 together with the allocation and prices computed in
the local auctions of the mediatorsMi on their sets Ωi (not necessarily Walrasian) form a
three-party competitive equilibrium.
Proof. A Walrasian equilibrium in the central auction is a price vector r ≥ 0 and an allocation
〈Ωi〉 of items to mediators such that every item with strictly positive price is allocated to a
mediator and every mediator is allocated a set in her demand Di(r). By the definition of
Di(r), the virtual auction for every set S ∈ Di(r) computes an allocation of the items in S
to her bidders and envy-free prices pi ≥ r (on Ω) such that every bidder in Bi is allocated a
set in his demand at prices pi and pij = rj for all items j /∈ S. Thus all requirements of a
three-party competitive equilibrium are satisfied.
Further, with ef-mediators a three-party competitive equilibrium exists whenever a
Walrasian equilibrium exists for the bidders and items without the mediators.
6For the results of this paper this could be any negative value including −∞.
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Theorem 3.4. Assume all mediators are ef-mediators and a Walrasian equilibrium exists for
the set of bidders and items (without mediators). Then there exists a three-party competitive
equilibrium.
Proof. A Walrasian equilibrium is a price vector r ≥ 0 and an allocation 〈Ωb〉 of items to
bidders such that every bidder is envy-free and all items with non-zero price are allocated to
a bidder. This equilibrium induces a trivial three-party competitive equilibrium where all
price vectors are identical to r and the allocation to mediators is uniquely determined by the
allocation 〈Ωb〉 to bidders. To see this note that the allocation 〈Ωb〉 with prices r is globally
envy-free for all bidders and thus for a mediatorMi the minimal locally envy-free prices
≥ r are equal to r for the set of items allocated to Bi. The revenue of all mediators under
this equilibrium is zero and for each mediator the set allocated to her is in her demand.7
The proof of Theorem 3.4 only shows the existence of trivial three-party equilibria that
basically ignores the presence of mediators. However, three-party equilibria and ef-mediators
allow for richer outcomes that permit the mediators to gain revenue from the competition
between their bidders while still representing the preferences of their bidders towards the
central seller. In the next section we show how to find such an equilibrium provided that
the valuations of all bidders are gross substitute. Recall that gross-substitute valuations
are the most general valuations that include unit demand valuations for which a Walrasian
equilibrium exists [GS99]; and that efficient algorithms for finding a Walrasian equilibrium
are only known for this valuation class.
4 An Efficient Algorithm for Gross-substitute Bidders
In this section we will show how to find, in polynomial time, a three-party competitive
equilibrium if the valuations of all bidders are gross substitute. The prices the bidders have
to pay at equilibrium, and thus the utilities they achieve, will be the same as in a Walrasian
equilibrium (between bidders and items) with minimum prices (Section 4.4). The price the
bidders pay is split between the mediators and the exchange. We show how to compute
an equilibrium where this split is best for the mediators and worst for the exchange. In
turn the computational load can be split between the mediators and the exchange as well.
The algorithm will be based on existing algorithms to compute Walrasian equilibria for
gross-substitute bidders.
The classical (two-party) allocation problem is the following: We are given k items
and n valuation functions and we should find an equilibrium allocation (with or without
equilibrium prices) if one exists. Recall that in general a valuation function has a description
of size exponential in k. Therefore, the input valuation functions can only be accessed via
an oracle, defined below. An efficient algorithm runs in time polynomial in n and k (where
the oracle access is assumed to take constant time).
Given an algorithm that computes a Walrasian allocation for gross-substitute bidders,
by a result of Gul and Stacchetti [GS99] minimum Walrasian prices can be computed by
7The above proof also holds for any other mediator definition that prohibits mediators to gain other
revenue than from the competition between her bidders in the local auction. This is because there is no
competition in the local auction when the allocation and prices in the central auction are determined by a
Walrasian equilibrium between bidders and items.
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solving the allocation problem k + 1 times. A Walrasian allocation can be combined with
any Walrasian prices to form a Walrasian equilibrium [GS99]. Thus we can assume for
gross-substitute valuations that a polynomial-time algorithm for the allocation problem also
returns a vector of minimum prices that support the allocation.
Two main oracle definitions that were considered in the literature are the valuation
oracle, where a query is a set of items S and the oracle replies with the exact value of S;
and the demand oracle, where a query is a price vector p and the oracle replies with a
demand representative D [BN07]. Note that in the literature the answer of a demand oracle
is sometimes defined to be all sets in the demand, however this cannot be assumed to be of
polynomial size even for gross-substitute valuations.
It is known that a demand oracle is strictly stronger than a valuation oracle, i.e., a
valuation query can be simulated by a polynomial number of demand queries but not vice
versa. For gross-substitute valuations, however, these two query models are polynomial-time
equivalent, see Paes Leme [PL14]. The two-party allocation problem is efficiently solvable
for gross-substitute valuations [NS06, PL14]. For other valuations efficient algorithms are
not known even in the demand query model.
We define the three-party allocation problem in the same manner. We are given k items,
n valuation functions over the subsets of items and m mediators, each associated with a set
of unique bidders. We are looking for a three-party equilibrium allocation (and equilibrium
prices) if one exists. We will assume that the input valuations are given through a valuation
oracle. An efficient algorithm runs in time polynomial in n and k (hence also in m ≤ n).
The algorithm will be based on the following central result: For gross substitute valuations
of the bidders an ef-mediator and an or-player over the valuations of the same bidders are
equivalent with respect to their demand and their allocation of items to bidders. Thus in
this case ef-mediators can be considered as if they have a gross-substitute valuation. Note
that for general valuations this equivalence does not hold.
Theorem 4.1. If the valuation functions of a set of bidders Bi are gross substitute, then the
demand of an ef-mediator for Bi is equal to the demand of an or-player for Bi. Moreover,
the allocation in a virtual auction of the ef-mediator for reserve prices r and a set of items
S in the demand is an optimal allocation for the or-player for S and r and vice versa.
To this end, we will first show for the virtual (and local) auctions that a modified
Walrasian equilibrium, the reserve-we(r), exists for gross-substitute valuations with reserve
prices. For this we will use yet another reduction to a (standard) Walrasian equilibrium
without reserve prices but with an additional additive player8.
Definition 4.2 (Walrasian equilibrium with reserve prices r (reserve-we(r)) [GHK+05]).
A Walrasian equilibrium with reserve prices r ≥ 0 (on Ω) is an envy-free allocation 〈Ωb〉
(on Ω) with prices p such that p ≥ r, and the price of every unallocated item is equal to its
reserve price, i.e., pj = rj for j 6∈ ∪bΩb. We say that 〈Ωb〉 is a reserve-we(r) allocation
(on Ω) and p are reserve-we(r) prices (on Ω).
8Such a player was introduced by Paes Leme [PL14] to find the demand of an or-player (with a slightly
different definition of or).
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4.1 Properties of Walrasian Equilibria with Reserve Prices
In this section we generalize several results about Walrasian equilibria to Walrasian equilibria
with reserve prices. Similar extensions were shown for unit demand valuations in [GHK+05].
We first define a suitable linear program. The reserve-lp(r), shown below, is a linear
program obtained from a reformulation of the dual of the LP-relaxation of the welfare
maximization integer program after adding reserve prices r ≥ 0.
maximize
∑
b∈B, S⊆Ω
xb,Svb(S) +
∑
j∈Ω
1− ∑
b∈B, S|j∈S
xb,S
 rj
subject to
∑
b∈B, S|j∈S
xb,S ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ Ω∑
S⊆Ω
xb,S ≤ 1 ∀b ∈ B
xb,S ≥ 0 ∀b ∈ B, S ⊆ Ω
We now show how the reserve-lp(r) is obtained. It is well known that for any collection
{v} of valuations a Walrasian equilibrium (we) exists if and only if the linear programming
relaxation of the welfare maximization problem (welfare-lp), given below, has an integral
solution. The integral solution combined with optimal dual prices yields a Walrasian
equilibrium and vice versa (see e.g. [BM97] for monotone valuations and [MCWG95] for
more general valuations).
maximize
∑
b∈B, S⊆Ω
xb,Svb(S) (welfare-lp)
subject to
∑
b∈B, S|j∈S
xb,S ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ Ω∑
S⊆Ω
xb,S ≤ 1 ∀b ∈ B
xb,S ≥ 0 ∀b ∈ B, S ⊆ Ω
The dual is as follows.
minimize
∑
b∈B
ub +
∑
j∈Ω
pj
subject to ub +
∑
j∈S
pj ≥ vb(S) ∀b ∈ B, S ⊆ Ω
ub ≥ 0 ∀b ∈ B
pj ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ Ω
We will think of the dual variables pjs as prices of items and of ubs as maximum utilities for
the bidders. Note that the dual objective is a function of the ps as the us are determined by
them. Now consider the effect of reserve prices, i.e., for all j ∈ Ω a lower bound rj ≥ 0 for
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the dual variables pj .
minimize
∑
b∈B
ub +
∑
j∈Ω
pj
subject to ub +
∑
j∈S
pj ≥ vb(S) ∀b ∈ B, S ⊆ Ω
ub ≥ 0 ∀b ∈ B
pj ≥ rj ∀j ∈ Ω
We can reformulate this linear program by a variable transformation with qj = pj − rj for
all j ∈ Ω. The term ∑j∈Ω rj is part of the input and thus can be omitted from the objective
value.
minimize
∑
b∈B
ub +
∑
j∈Ω
qj +
∑
j∈Ω
rj
subject to ub +
∑
j∈S
qj ≥ vb(S)−
∑
j∈S
rj ∀b ∈ B, S ⊆ Ω
ub ≥ 0 ∀b ∈ B
qj ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ Ω
With this reformulation we obtain the following primal, which we call reserve-lp(r). Again∑
j∈Ω rj can be omitted from the objective value without changing the set of solutions.
maximize
∑
b∈B, S⊆Ω
xb,S
vb(S)−∑
j∈S
rj
+ ∑
j∈Ω
rj (reserve-lp(r))
subject to
∑
b∈B, S|j∈S
xb,S ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ Ω∑
S⊆Ω
xb,S ≤ 1 ∀b ∈ B
xb,S ≥ 0 ∀b ∈ B, S ⊆ Ω
The objective value of the reserve-lp(r) can be rewritten as
∑
b∈B, S⊆Ω
xb,Svb(S) +
∑
j∈Ω
1− ∑
b∈B, S|j∈S
xb,S
 rj . (1)
For an integral solution to the reserve-lp(r) we can interpret this reformulation as a
solution to a welfare-lp with an additional additive player whose value for an item is
equal to that item’s reserve price. We will use this interpretation to extend known results for
Walrasian equilibria to Walrasian equilibria with reserve prices. The results are summarized
in Theorem 4.4 below. We use the following definition.
Definition 4.3 (additional additive player). Let {vb} be a set of valuation functions over Ω
for bidders b ∈ B, and let r ≥ 0 be reserve prices for the items in Ω. Let {v′b′} be the set of
valuation functions when an additive bidder a is added, i.e., for the bidders b′ ∈ B′ = B∪{a}
with v′b′(S) = vb′(S) for b′ 6= a and v′a(S) =
∑
j∈S rj for all sets S ⊆ Ω. For an allocation
〈Ωb〉b∈B we define 〈Ω′b′〉b′∈B′ with Ω′b′ = Ωb′ for b′ 6= a and Ω′a = Ω \ ∪bΩb.
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Theorem 4.4 will be used in the next section to characterize the outcome of the virtual
auctions of an ef-mediator. It also provides a polynomial-time algorithm to compute a
reserve-we(r) when the bidders in B have gross-substitute valuations, given a polynomial-
time algorithm for a we for gross-substitute bidders.
Theorem 4.4. (a) The allocation 〈Ωb〉 and the prices p are a reserve-we(r) for r ≥ 0 and
bidders B if and only if the allocation 〈Ω′b′〉 and prices p′ are a we for the bidders B′, where
we have pj = p′j for j ∈ ∪b∈BΩb and pj′ = rj′ for j′ ∈ Ω\∪b∈BΩb (a1 ). The allocation 〈Ωb〉 is
a reserve-we(r) allocation if and only if 〈Ωb〉 is an integral solution to the reserve-lp(r)
(a2 ).
(b) If the valuations {v} are gross substitute, then (b1 ) there exists a reserve-we(r)
for {v} and (b2 ) the reserve-we(r) price vectors form a complete lattice.
Proof of Theorem 4.4. (a1) ⇒: Let 〈Ωb〉 and prices p be a reserve-we(r) for bidders B.
Then 〈Ωb〉 is an envy-free allocation at prices p ≥ r, and all unallocated items j have price
pj = rj . Let Ω0 denote the set of unallocated items. A we for the bidders B′ is given by
prices p and allocation 〈Ω′b′〉 with Ω′b′ = Ωb′ for b′ 6= a and Ω′a = Ω0. All items are allocated
in 〈Ω′b′〉. The allocation for the bidders b′ 6= a clearly is envy-free as neither allocation nor
prices were changed. Bidder a is envy-free because p ≥ r and pj = rj for j ∈ Ω′a.
⇐: Let 〈Ω′b′〉 and prices p′ be a we for the bidders B′. Then 〈Ω′b′〉 is an envy-free
allocation and all unallocated items have a price of zero. For bidder a to be envy-free it
must hold that all items j not allocated to a have a price pj ≥ rj and all items j′ allocated
to a have pj′ ≤ rj′ . We construct a reserve-we(r) for the bidders B as follows. For all
items allocated to bidders in B in 〈Ω′b′〉 allocation and prices remain the same. For all other
items j their price is set to rj and they are left unallocated. The allocation for the bidders
B remains envy-free because the prices of the now unallocated items were only increased.
(a2): First note that for bidders B′ in a we, and therefore in an integral solution to the
welfare-lp, we can assume w.l.o.g. that all items are allocated because we have r ≥ 0
and therefore all otherwise unallocated items can be allocated to the additive player a. The
objective value of the welfare-lp for an integral solution 〈Ω′b′〉 for bidders B′ can be written
as ∑b∈B vb(Ωb) + r(Ω′a), which is, w.l.o.g., equal to ∑b∈B vb(Ωb) + r(Ω \ ∪b∈BΩb). The latter
is equivalent to Equation (1) for the allocation 〈Ωb〉. Thus there is (w.l.o.g.) a one-to-one
correspondence between integral solutions to the welfare-lp for bidders B′ and integral
solutions to the reserve-lp(r) for bidders B. Hence, 〈Ω′b′〉 is an optimal solution to the
welfare-lp for B′ if and only if 〈Ωb〉 is an optimal solution to the reserve-lp(r) for B.
Note that the corresponding constraints are satisfied as both 〈Ω′b′〉 and 〈Ωb〉 are allocations,
respectively. To complete the proof, consider the following chain of “iff” statements.
(〈Ωb〉, p) is a reserve-we(r) for B ⇐⇒ (〈Ω′b〉, p′) is a we for B′ ,
(〈Ω′b〉, p′) is a we for B′ ⇐⇒ (〈Ω′b〉) solves welfare-lp for B′ ,
(〈Ω′b〉) solves welfare-lp for B′ ⇐⇒ (〈Ωb〉) solves reserve-lp(r) for B ,
and thus
(〈Ωb〉, p) is a reserve-we(r) for B ⇐⇒ (〈Ωb〉) solves reserve-lp(r) for B .
(b1): The valuations {v} of the bidders in B are gross substitute if and only if the
valuations {v′} of the bidders in B′ are gross substitute, as the only difference between B
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and B′ is the additive bidder a whose value for an item j is equal to its reserve price rj ≥ 0.
Recall that every (non-negative) additive valuation is gross substitute. The claim then
directly follows from (a1) and the existence of a we for {v′}.
(b2): To show that the reserve-we(r) price vectors form a complete lattice, we have to
show that for any two reserve-we(r) price vectors p1 and p2 the price vectors min(p1, p2)
and max(p1, p2), where the min and the max is meant element-wise, are reserve-we(r)
price vectors as well. We will use (a1) and that for gross-substitute valuations we price
vectors form a complete lattice. The latter implies that for two we price vectors q′1 and q′2,
we have that q′min = min(q′1, q′2) and q′max = max(q′1, q′2) are we price vectors as well. Recall
the relation of p′ and p in (a1), i.e., p = max(p′, r). By (a1) we have that (i) p′1 and p′2 are we
price vectors for B′ and (ii) qmin and qmax are reserve-we(r) price vectors for B. Let q′1 = p′1
and let q′2 = p′2. The claim follows from min(p1, p2) = qmin and max(p1, p2) = qmax.
4.2 The Equivalence of the EF-mediator and the OR-player for Gross-
substitute Valuations
In this section we prove Theorem 4.1, that is, the equivalence, for gross-substitute bidders,
between the demand of an ef-mediatorMi and the demand of an or-player and, for the
sets in the demand, the equivalence of the allocations of items to bidders of an or-player
and an ef-mediator in the sense that the allocation implied by the or-player could be used
by the ef-mediator and vice versa.
If the valuations of the bidders in Bi are all gross substitute, by Theorem 4.4 (b) a
reserve-we(r) with minimum prices exists for all reserve prices r ≥ 0. We will use this
several times in this section. We phrase all the statements in this section for gross-substitute
valuations of the bidders, although they all hold as long as all minimal envy-free prices that
respect the reserve prices are equal to the minimum reserve-we(r) prices.
The proof proceeds as follows. We first characterize the demand of an ef-mediator for
bidders with gross-substitute valuations. As a first step we show that for such bidders an
ef-mediator actually computes a reserve-we(r) with minimum prices in each of her virtual
auctions. The minimality of the prices implies that whenever the virtual auction prices for
an item set S are globally envy-free, they are also minimum reserve-we(r) prices for the
set of all items Ω and the bidders in Bi. Thus, given reserve prices r, all virtual auctions
of an ef-mediator result in the same price vector p as long as they are run on a set S
with non-negative revenue. With the help of some technical lemmata, we then completely
characterize the demand of an ef-mediator and show that the mediator does not have to
run multiple virtual auctions to determine her demand; it suffices to run one virtual auction
on Ω where the set of allocated items is a set in the demand of the ef-mediator. Thus for
gross-substitute bidders the mediator can efficiently answer demand queries and compute
the outcome of her local auction.
Finally we compare the utility function of the or-player to the optimal value of the
reserve-lp(r) to observe that they have to be equal (up to an additive constant) for item
sets that are in the demand of the or-player. Combined with the above characterization
of the demand of the mediator, we can then relate both demands at central auction prices
r to optimal solutions of the reserve-lp(r) for r and Ω and hence show the equality
of the demands for these two mediator definitions for gross-substitute valuations of the
bidders. Recall that an or-player over gross-substitute valuations has a gross-substitute
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valuation [LLN06]. Thus in this case we can regard the ef-mediator as having a gross-
substitute valuation. This implies that a Walrasian equilibrium for the central auction exists
and, with the efficient demand oracle defined above, can be computed efficiently when all
bidders have gross-substitute valuations and all mediators are ef-mediators.
We start the proof of Theorem 4.1 with showing that the mediator computes in every
virtual auction a reserve-we(r) with minimum prices. The proof of this lemma is given in
the next subsection.
Lemma 4.5. If the valuations of an ef-mediator’s bidders are gross substitute, then the
ef-mediator computes minimum reserve-we(r) prices in her virtual auctions, i.e., items
not allocated in a virtual auction have a price equal to their reserve price.
This lemma implies that whenever for a set of items S a virtual auction computes globally
envy-free prices pS , these prices have to be equal to the minimum reserve-we(r) prices on
Ω.
Corollary 4.6. If the valuation functions of all bidders b ∈ Bi are gross substitute, then for
reserve prices r ≥ 0 and all sets S ⊆ Ω such that Ri,r(S) 6= −1 the virtual auction prices pS
are equal to pΩ for all items in Ω.
It follows that an item j with pΩj > rj must be in all sets with Ri,r(S) 6= −1 and thus
in all demand representatives of the mediator. This implies that two sets S and S′ with
Ri,r(S) 6= −1 and Ri,r(S′) 6= −1 can only differ in items j with pΩj = rj . Thus if for
both S and S′ all items are allocated in the virtual auction, then Ri,r(S) = pS(S)− r(S) =
pS
′(S′)−r(S′) = Ri,r(S′). Furthermore if for a set S′′ with Ri,r(S′′) 6= −1 an item j ∈ S′′ with
rj > 0 is not allocated in the virtual auction, then Ri,r(S′′) < Ri,r(S). Hence, if for a set S
with Ri,r(S) 6= −1 all items are allocated in the virtual auction, then Ri,r(S) = maxS′ Ri,r(S′)
and thus S is in the demand of the mediator. Note that by Definition 3.2, if there are
multiple reserve-we(r) allocations on S for the prices pS , the mediator chooses the one
that maximizes ∑b∈Bi pS(Sb), i.e., if the mediator can allocate all items in S, she will.
Corollary 4.7. Assume that the valuation functions of all bidders b ∈ Bi are gross substitute.
Let r ≥ 0 be some reserve prices. If for some set S with Ri,r(S) 6= −1 all items with strictly
positive reserve price can be allocated in the virtual auction of the mediator, then S is in
Di(r).
To completely characterize demand and allocation of the ef-mediator, we first show a
useful technical result. We compare the minimum reserve-we(r) prices for a set T ⊆ Ω
with the minimum reserve-we(r) prices for a subset S ⊆ T . For this we will use the
following well-known result for Walrasian equilibria by Gul and Stacchetti [GS99] that by
Theorem 4.4 (a1) also holds with reserve prices.
Lemma 4.8 ([GS99]). Any Walrasian price vector combined with any Walrasian allocation
yields a Walrasian equilibrium.
Corollary 4.9 (of Lemma 4.8 and Theorem 4.4). For r ≥ 0 a reserve-we(r) price vector
combined with any reserve-we(r) allocation yields a reserve-we(r).
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The following lemma shows that, for suitable sets S and T with S ⊆ T , the minimum
prices in a reserve-we(r) on S are equal for items in S to the corresponding prices in T .
Part (a) of the lemma was shown for monotone gross-substitute valuations without reserve
prices in [GS99].
Lemma 4.10. Assume the valuation functions of all bidders b ∈ Bi are gross substitute. Let
T ⊆ Ω be a set of items and let S be a subset of T . For fixed reserve prices r ≥ 0, let (〈Tb〉, pT )
be a reserve-we(r) with minimum prices on T and let (〈Sb〉, pS) be a reserve-we(r) with
minimum prices on S. Then (a) pTj ≤ pSj for all j ∈ S and (b) if ∪bTb ⊆ S, then pTj = pSj
for all j ∈ S and (〈Tb〉, pS) is a reserve-we(r) with minimum prices on S.
Proof. (a) Let V be the maximal valuation of any bidder, i.e., maxb,T ′⊆Ω vb(T ′). Let p′j = pSj
for j ∈ S and let p′j = max(V, rj) for j ∈ T \ S. Then (〈Sb〉, p′) is envy-free for all bidders
on T and p′ ≥ r. By Lemma 4.15 the prices pT are the minimum envy-free prices ≥ r on T .
Thus pTj ≤ p′j for all j ∈ T and hence pTj ≤ pSj for all j ∈ S.
(b) If the set S contains all items in ∪bTb, then the prices pT restricted to the set S with
the allocation 〈Tb〉 are a reserve-we(r) on S. Thus by the minimality of the prices pS , we
have pTj ≥ pSj for all j ∈ S. Combined with (a) this shows pTj = pSj for all j ∈ S.
The allocation 〈Tb〉 with prices pT restricted to S are a reserve-we(r) on S and the
prices pT restricted to the set S are equal to the minimum reserve-we(r) prices pS on S.
Hence by Corollary 4.9 (〈Tb〉, pS) is a reserve-we(r) with minimum prices on S.
To characterize the demand of the mediator, we further need that the maximum revenue
the mediator can obtain is non-negative for all reserve prices r ≥ 0. To compare the demand
Di(r) of an ef-mediator to the demand of an or-mediator, we further use that for every set
in Di(r) all items with positive reserve price are allocated in the local auction.
Lemma 4.11. Assume the valuation functions of all bidders b ∈ Bi are gross substitute and
let r ≥ 0 be any reserve price vector. (a) There exists a (potentially empty) set S ⊆ Ω such
that the revenue Ri,r(S) of an ef-mediator Mi is non-negative. (b) For a set T ∈ Di(r)
with virtual auction allocation 〈Tb〉 all items j ∈ T with rj > 0 are allocated.
Proof. (a) Let (〈Ωb〉, p) be the outcome of the virtual auction of an ef-mediator for Ω. Take
S = ∪bΩb. By Lemma 4.5 and Lemma 4.10 (b) (〈Ωb〉, p) is not only envy-free on Ω but
further is a reserve-we(r) with minimum prices for the virtual auction of an ef-mediator
for the set S. Thus the mediator can allocate all items in S in her virtual auction for S.
Thus by p ≥ r the revenue Ri,r(S) = ∑b p(Ωb)− r(S) = p(S)− r(S) of the mediator for the
set S is non-negative.
(b) By (a) we have Ri,r(T ) ≥ 0 and thus Ri,r(T ) = ∑b pT (Tb) − r(T ). Consider the
set T ′ = ∪bTb. Assume by contradiction some items with rj > 0 are not allocated in
〈Tb〉. By Lemma 4.5 pTj = rj for all items j ∈ Ω \ T ′. For the virtual auction prices pT
′
for T ′ we have by definition pT ′j = rj for j ∈ Ω \ T ′. By Lemma 4.10 (b) pT
′
j = pTj for
all j ∈ T ′ and thus pT ′j = pTj for all j ∈ Ω. Thus (〈Tb〉, pT
′) is envy-free on the whole
set of items Ω, i.e., Ri,r(T ′) 6= −1. The mediator can allocate all items in T ′; hence,
Ri,r(T ′) = p(T ′)− r(T ′) > Ri,r(T ) = p(T ′)− r(T ), a contradiction to T ∈ Di(r).
This proof gives us immediately an efficient way to determine a set S with Ri,r(S) ≥ 0:
Run the virtual auction on Ω with reserve prices r and return the set S of allocated items.
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Combined with Corollary 4.6, this procedure actually yields not only a set with non-negative
revenue but even a set in the demand of the mediator.
Before we continue, we observe a relation between the utility of the or-player for reserve
prices r and the or over modified valuation functions9 {v˜} with v˜b(S) = vb(S)− r(S) for all
S ⊆ Ω. Note that v˜or(S) + r(S) equals the optimal value of the reserve-lp(r) on S as long
as an optimal integral solution exists. This relation gives a characterization of the demand
of the or-player with reserve prices.
Observation 4.12. The utility of the or-player at prices r is given by
uor,r(S) = max〈Sb〉
∑
b∈Bi
vb(Sb)
− r(S) = max
〈Sb〉
∑
b∈Bi
vb(Sb)− r(Sb)
− r(S \ ∪bSb)
The or of the valuation functions v˜b(S) = vb(S)− r(S) is given by
v˜or(S) = max〈Sb〉
∑
b∈Bi
v˜b(Sb) = max〈Sb〉
∑
b∈Bi
vb(Sb)− r(Sb)

By definition we have v˜or(S) ≥ uor,r(S) (1 ).
Let the allocation 〈S∗b 〉 be arg max〈Sb〉
∑
b∈Bi v˜b(Sb) for the set S and let S
∗ = ∪bS∗b ⊆ S.
Then v˜or(S) = v˜or(S∗) = uor,r(S∗) (2a). Thus v˜or(S) > uor,r(S) iff uor,r(S∗) > uor,r(S)
iff S /∈ Dor(r) (2b).
The following two lemmata finally show that the demand of an ef-mediator is equal
to the demand of an or-player for any central auctions prices r ≥ 0 and gross-substitute
valuations of the bidders. The proofs combine the results obtained so far to relate both
demands to an optimal solution of the reserve-lp(r) for reserve prices r and the items in
Ω.
Lemma 4.13. If the valuation functions of all bidders b ∈ Bi are gross substitute, then for
any reserve prices r ≥ 0 every set S in the demand of an ef-mediator is in the demand
of the or-player. Additionally, the or-player could use the ef-mediator’s allocation of the
items in S to the bidders in Bi to maximize her utility.
Proof. Let S be a set in the demand Di(r) of an ef-mediatorMi for some reserve prices
r ≥ 0. By Lemma 4.11 (a) there exists a set S′ with Ri,r(S′) ≥ 0, thus for S in the demand
we have Ri,r(S) ≥ Ri,r(S′) ≥ 0. Let (〈Sb〉, p) be the outcome of the virtual auction ofMi
for the set S. By Lemma 4.5 (〈Sb〉, p) is a reserve-we(r) with minimum prices on the
item set S. Since Ri,r(S) ≥ 0, the allocation 〈Sb〉 is envy-free on Ω. As the prices p are
reserve-we(r) prices for S and are extended with pj = rj for j ∈ Ω \ S, the allocation
〈Sb〉 and prices p are also a reserve-we(r) for the item set Ω. Hence by Theorem 4.4 (a2)
the allocation 〈Sb〉 is an integral solution to the reserve-lp(r) and thus maximizes the
objective value of the reserve-lp(r) for both the item sets S and Ω. Since the value of
the reserve-lp(r) only depends on the allocated sets, the two objective values are the
same. Note that by the definition of v˜or in Observation 4.12 the objective value of the
9The valuations {v˜} might be non-monotone even if the valuations {v} are monotone. This is not relevant
here.
17
reserve-lp(r) is given by v˜or(Ω) + r(Ω) with v˜or(Ω) = maxS′∈Ω v˜or(S′). Thus we have
v˜or(S) = v˜or(Ω) = maxS′∈Ω v˜or(S′). By Lemma 4.11 (b) we can assume that all items
j ∈ S with rj > 0 are allocated in 〈Sb〉, which implies that
∑
b∈Bi r(Sb) = r(S) and thus
v˜or(S) = uor,r(S). Since we have v˜or(S′) ≥ uor,r(S′) for all S′ ⊆ Ω by Observation 4.12 (1),
this implies uor,r(S) ≥ maxS′∈Ω uor,r(S′). Since S ⊆ Ω, it also holds that uor,r(S) ≤
maxS′∈Ω uor,r(S′), implying that uor,r(S) = maxS′∈Ω uor,r(S′). Thus, S is in the demand
Dor(r) of the or-player for reserve prices r and the or-player could use the allocation 〈Sb〉
to maximize her utility.
Lemma 4.14. If the valuation functions of all bidders b ∈ Bi are gross substitute, then for
any reserve prices r ≥ 0 every set S in the demand of the or-player is in the demand of an
ef-mediator. Additionally, the ef-mediator could use the or-player’s allocation of the items
in S to the bidders in Bi to maximize his revenue.
Proof. Let S be a set in the demand Dor(r) of the or-player for some reserve prices r ≥ 0.
Let 〈Sb〉 be the allocation of the or-player for the set S. By Observation 4.12 (2b) we have
uor,r(S) = v˜or(S). Recall that v˜or(S) + r(S) is equal to the objective value of the reserve-
lp(r) for the set S. Furthermore v˜or(S) = v˜or(Ω) because otherwise by Observation 4.12 (2a)
there would be some allocation 〈Ωb〉 with S′ = ∪bΩb s.t. v˜or(Ω) = v˜or(S′) = uor,r(S′) and
thus the utility of the or-player for the set S′ would be higher than for the set S, contradicting
S ∈ Dor(r). Hence the allocation 〈Sb〉 of the or-player is an integral solution to the reserve-
lp(r) on S as well as on Ω. Let p be the minimum reserve-we(r) prices p such that (〈Sb〉, p)
is a reserve-we(r) on Ω. By Lemma 4.10 (b) we know that (〈Sb〉, p), with the prices p
restricted to S, is also a reserve-we(r) with minimum prices on S. By Lemma 4.5 the
virtual auction of an ef-mediatorMi for the set S computes the same unique minimum
prices p. Further v˜or(S) = uor,r(S) implies that all items with strictly positive reserve price
are allocated in 〈Sb〉. ThusMi could allocate all items in S with strictly positive reserve
price by using the allocation 〈Sb〉. The allocation 〈Sb〉 is envy-free at prices p on S. Thus
the revenue of the mediator for the set S is not set to −1. Hence by Corollary 4.7 the set S
is in the demand of the ef-mediator.
4.2.1 Proof of Lemma 4.5
Lemma 4.5 is a corollary to the following, more general, lemma.
Lemma 4.15. Consider all envy-free outcomes with prices p ≥ r for a set of valuations
{v} and reserve prices r ≥ 0. If the valuations {v} are gross substitute, then the minimum
reserve-we(r) prices are minimum envy-free prices p with p ≥ r among all envy-free
outcomes with p ≥ r.
Proof. By Theorem 4.4 (b2) all reserve-we(r) price vectors form a lattice. Let p∗ be the
minimum price in this lattice. Recall that every reserve-we(r) price vector is also an
envy-free price vector. Assume by contradiction there exists an envy-free price p such that
p∗ 6≤ p. Let J = {j | pj < p∗j}, let δ = minj∈J {p∗j − pj} be the min-gap and p∗−δJ = p∗ − δJ
where δJ is the vector with value δ to each item in J and 0 otherwise. Note that by
assumption J 6= ∅, δ > 0 and by minimality of p∗ no reserve-we(r) allocation exists for
p∗−δJ .
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Let wb(q) denote the maximum utility of a bidder b for a price vector q, i.e., wb(q) =
ub,q(D) for someD ∈ Db(q). Following Gul and Stacchetti [GS00] and Ben-Zwi et al. [BZLN13],
we define a requirement function and use Ben-Zwi et al. [BZLN13]’s extension of (one direction
of) Hall’s Theorem.
Definition 4.16 (requirement function). Define for a set S, a bidder b, and prices q the
requirement function fb,q(S) = minD∈Db(q){|D ∩ S|}.
Observation 4.17 (compare Lemma 2.10 in [BZLN13]). For a set S, a bidder b, and prices
q, we have fb,q(S) ≥ (wb(q)− wb(q + δS))/δ.
Proof. Let D′ = arg minD∈Db(q){|D ∩ S|}. Then wb(q + δS) ≥ ub,q+δS (D′) = ub,q(D′) −
δfb,q(S) = wb(q)− δfb,q(S), that is, δfb,q(S) ≥ wb(q)− wb(q + δS).
Observation 4.18 (Observation 3.2 in [BZLN13]). If for a price vector q there exists S
such that ∑b fb,q(S) > |S|, then q is not envy free. In this case we call S over-demanded at
prices q.
Proof. In any envy-free allocation of S, bidder b must receive a set from his demand, thus
b must receive at least fb,q(S) many items of S. As each item of S is allocated to at most
one bidder, it follows that at least ∑b fb,q(S) > |S| many items of S are allocated in any
envy-free allocation. Contradiction.
Note that the utilities wb(q) and prices q are a feasible solution to the dual of the reserve-
lp(r) for any prices with q ≥ r. Further note that any optimal solution to the dual of the
reserve-lp(r) implies that there exists a corresponding reserve-we(r). By optimality of
p∗ and the assumption that no reserve-we(r) allocation exists for the prices p∗−δJ , the
objective value of the dual for p∗−δJ is strictly greater than the objective of the dual for
p∗, i.e., ∑bwb(p∗−δJ) + p∗−δJ(Ω) >∑bwb(p∗) + p∗(Ω). Now by definition of p∗−δJ we know
that p∗−δJ(Ω) + δ|J | = p∗(Ω), hence together we have that ∑bwb(p∗−δJ)−∑bwb(p∗) > δ|J |.
With ∑b fb,p∗−δJ (J) ≥ (∑bwb(p∗−δJ)−∑bwb(p∗)) /δ by Observation 4.17 we have that∑
b fb,p∗−δJ (J) > |J | and thus the set J is over-demanded at p∗−δJ by Observation 4.18.
Next we use the following theorem by Gul and Stacchetti [GS00] to show that this implies∑
b fb,p(J) > |J |, i.e., a contradiction to the assumption that the prices p are envy-free. By
another result of Gul and Stacchetti [GS99], monotone valuations that are gross substitute
also satisfy the single improvement property.
Theorem 4.19 (Theorem 2 in [GS00]). Let q(1), q(2) be two price vectors such that q(1) ≤ q(2)
and S a set with ∀j ∈ S, q(1)(j) = q(2)(j). Then for a bidder b that fulfills the single
improvement property the following apply
1. fb,q(1)(S) ≤ fb,q(2)(S)
2. fb,q(1)(Ω \ S) ≥ fb,q(2)(Ω \ S)
Recall that by the definition of J and p∗−δJ , we have pj ≤ p∗−δJj for j ∈ J and
pj ≥ p∗−δJj for j 6∈ J . Now if we take q(1) = p∗−δJ and take q(2)j = p∗−δJj if j ∈ J and
q
(2)
j = pj if j /∈ J , then q(1) ≤ q(2) and thus by the first part of the theorem we get that
fb,q(2)(J) ≥ fb,p∗−δJ (J) > |J |, i.e., the set J is over-demanded at prices q(2). On the other
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hand, if we take q(3) = p and the same q(2), then q(3) ≤ q(2) and q(3)j = q(2)j for j 6∈ J , and
hence by the second part of the theorem with S = Ω \ J and thus Ω \ S = J we have that
fb,p(J) ≥ fb,q(2)(J) > |J |. This shows that the set J is over-demanded at p as well and thus
there cannot be an envy-free allocation for prices p by Observation 4.18.
4.3 Computing an Equilibrium
The basic three-party auction is simple: First run the central auction at the exchange, then
the local auctions at the mediators. In this section we summarize the details and analyze the
time needed to compute a three-party competitive equilibrium. We assume that all bidders
have gross-substitute valuations and that their valuations can be accessed via a demand
oracle. We assume, for simplicity, that there are m ef-mediators, each with n/m distinct
bidders. We will use known polynomial-time auctions for the two-party allocation problem,
see [PL14] for a recent survey. Theorem 4.4 shows how such an auction can be modified to
yield a reserve-we(r) instead of a Walrasian equilibrium.
Let A be a polynomial-time algorithm that can access n gross-substitute valuations over
subsets of k items Ω via a demand oracle and outputs a Walrasian price vector p ∈ Rk and a
Walrasian allocation 〈Ωi〉i∈[n]. Let the runtime of A be T (n, k) = O(nαkβ) for constants α,
β.
Although we can assume oracle access to the bidders’ valuations, we cannot assume it for
the mediators’ (gross-substitute) valuations, as they are not part of the input. However, as
outlined in the previous section, a mediator can determine a set in her demand by running a
single virtual auction to compute a reserve-we(r), i.e., there is an efficient demand oracle
for the mediators. Hence, solving the allocation problem for the central auction can be
done in time T (m, k) · T (n/m, k) = O(nαk2β). Further, the local auctions for all mediators
take time O(m · T (n/m, k)) and thus the total time to compute a three-party competitive
equilibrium is O(nαk2β). Note that the computation at the exchange takes only T (m, k)
time and that the mediators are assumed to be separated, that is, the computation at the
mediators can be done in parallel.
4.3.1 Small Number of Items
In the context of ad exchanges it is natural to assume that the number of items is very small
and independent of the number of bidders. In the following we discuss the computation of
an equilibrium in this case. The results on this section will hold as long as the number of
items k is o(logn).
When the number of items is that small, bidders’ valuations can be represented as
complete lists. More than that, given a bidder valuation oracle, it takes only 2k queries
to compile such a list. In order to find the valuation lists of all the mediators as well, we
have to solve the allocation problem of each mediator 2k times, i.e., compute the or of the
bidder valuations for all subsets. Given the valuations of the mediators, the central auction
is equivalent to solving the two-party allocation problem for the mediators. Let T ′(n, k) be
the runtime of algorithm A when valuations are accessed via a valuation oracle. Then the
overall running time to determine a three-party competitive equilibrium with this approach
is T̂ (n,m, k) = m · 2k · T ′(n/m, k) + T ′(m, k).
We show next how this approach can be extended to an almost linear time algorithm
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for such a small number of items by artificially introducing mediators of mediators (and
recurse). Assume for simplicity T ′(n, k) = O(nα · f(k)) where f(·) is at most exponential in
k and α = 1 + γ for some γ > 0.10 By choosing m = n1/2 we obtain a running time of
T̂ (n, n1/2, k) = n1/2 · 2k · nα/2 · f(k) + nα/2 · f(k) ,
=
(
2kn1+γ/2 + n1/2+γ/2
)
· f(k) ,
≤ c · nα/2+1/2 · 22k ,
for some constant c ≥ 0. Let us add one level of recursion:
T̂ (n, n1/2, k) = 2k · n1/2 · T̂ (n1/2, n1/4, k)
+ T̂ (n1/2, n1/4, k) ,
≤ c · 23k · n1/2 · (n1/2)α/2+1/2
+ c · 22k · (n1/2)α/2+1/2 ,
≤ c · 23k · (n1/2+1/4+γ/4+1/4
+ n1/4+γ/4+1/4) ,
≤ c · 23k · n(α/2+1/2)/2+1/2 .
For t levels of mediators we obtain T̂ (n, n1/2, k) ≤ c · 2(t+1)k · nαt/2+1/2 where α0 = α and
αt = αt−12 +
1
2 =
γ
2t + 1. Since for constant δ = 1/(t+ 1) we have that k = o(logn) implies
k = o(lognδ) and α is constant, we can choose t to achieve a runtime of O(n1+ε+o(1)) for
any fixed ε > 0.
An almost linear time algorithm to solve the two-party allocation problem when k =
o( lognlog logn) can be obtained by reducing the problem to unit-demand valuations in the following
way. Assume there are n bidders and k = o( lognlog logn) items Ω. The following method computes
in almost linear time an allocation between bidders and items that maximizes social welfare
(i.e., ∑b vb(Ωb)), which is equal to a Walrasian allocation if it exists. Consider all possible
partitions of the k items from which there are O(kk) = O(2k log k) many. For a partition P
let the sets in the partition be the new items and let the value of the bidders for a new item
be their value for the set. Define a unit-demand valuation function for each bidder based
on these values. Then solve the allocation problem for the new items and the unit-demand
valuations. The resulting allocation maximizes social welfare for the given partition. Over
all possible partitions the one with maximum social welfare yields the desired solution. For
unit-demand valuations the allocation problem is equivalent to the maximum weight bipartite
matching problem that can be solved with the Hungarian method in time O(nk2) [Fra05].
Thus the total time is O(nkk+2).
4.4 Relation to Minimum Walrasian Prices
The following lemma shows that the prices the bidders have to pay at the computed three-
party equilibrium, and thus the utilities they achieve, are the same as in a Walrasian
equilibrium between bidders and items with minimum prices.
10Current methods have α = 6 and thus γ = 5.
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Lemma 4.20. Let allocation 〈Ωβ〉 and prices q be a Walrasian equilibrium with minimum
prices for gross-substitute bidders B and items Ω. Let each bidder be connected to exactly
one of m ef-mediators and let Bi denote the set of bidders connected to mediatorMi. Let
r, p1, p2, . . . , pm be the price vectors of a three-party equilibrium for the mediators and bidders
and let 〈Ωi〉 be the equilibrium allocation of items to mediators and 〈Ωb〉 the equilibrium
allocation of items to bidders. Let r and 〈Ωi〉 be a Walrasian equilibrium with minimum
prices for the mediators and let pj = maxi(pij) for all items j. Then p = q.
Proof. As 〈Ωb〉 and p form a Walrasian equilibrium for bidders B and items Ω, we have p ≥ q.
Recall p ≥ r. Further 〈Ωβ〉, 〈Ω′i = ∪β∈BiΩβ〉, and r′ = p1′ = · · · = pm′ = q form a three-party
equilibrium (compare Theorem 3.4) and 〈Ω′i〉 and q provide a Walrasian equilibrium for the
mediators. Thus by the minimality of r we have q ≥ r. Assume by contradiction that there
exists an item j with pj > qj . By Lemma 4.5 and Corollary 4.6 each price vector pi is the
minimum envy-free price vector ≥ r for the bidders Bi. Thus at prices q 6≥ p there is no
allocation that is envy-free for all bidders B, a contradiction.
5 Discussion and Future Directions
We proposed a new model for auctions at ad exchanges. Our model is more general than
previous models in the sense that it takes the incentives of all three types of participants
into account and that it allows to express preferences over multiple items. Interestingly, at
least when gross-substitute valuations are considered, this generality does not come at the
cost of tractability, as shown by our polynomial-time algorithm. Note that this is the most
general result we could expect in light of the classical (two-sided) literature on combinatorial
auctions.
We considered the special case of a small number of items for which we showed that
existing polynomial-time algorithms for two-party equilibria can be sped-up by adding
mediators.
In our model, with gross-substitute bidders, the revenue of the mediators only comes
from decreasing the central seller’s profit (stated formally in Section 4.4). This explains
the willingness of the bidders to use mediators. The central seller experiences a decrease
in its workload with the introduction of mediators, which may partially describe its own
inclination for participating in the market.
Since our model tries to capture a single “user-impression-of-a-web-page” sold at an ad
exchange, a natural follow up work will try to model what happens over time. This direction
should take into account the change in the environment, as the bidders and their valuations
as well as the mediators and their connections to bidders can be different for each user
impression.
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